August 27, 2025 | Lorenzo Cicchi

Understanding Europe’s Pandemic Politics

This article summarizes the main findings of the REGROUP Focus Paper The Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on political cleavages in Europe. The paper synthesizes research from the REGROUP project’s Work Package 3, which examined how the pandemic affected political divisions across the European Union through analysis of survey data, protest events, and political discourse. This research reveals a surprising truth: economic hardship mattered less than we might expect in shaping political attitudes during the pandemic. Instead, trust in science and pre-existing ideological beliefs proved far more powerful in determining how citizens responded to crisis measures.

The Paradox of Scarce Economic Impact

Conventional wisdom suggests that those hit hardest economically by lockdowns – hospitality workers, entertainment professionals, small business owners – would most strongly oppose health-prioritizing policies. REGROUP research tells a different story. Workers in severely affected sectors showed no significant difference in their policy preferences compared to those in protected industries. A bartender who lost their job was no more likely to oppose lockdowns than a software developer working comfortably from home.

This finding challenges fundamental assumptions about political behavior. Material self-interest, long considered a primary driver of political preferences, took a back seat to deeper ideological orientations and institutional trust. The strongest predictors of pandemic policy preferences were trust in scientific institutions and left-right ideological positioning, not employment status or income loss.

The Cultural Battlefield

While economic grievances failed to consolidate into unified opposition, cultural conflicts erupted across Europe. The pandemic activated what researchers term a “cultural super-cleavage” – a fundamental divide about authority, knowledge, and freedom that transcends traditional political categories. This was not simply about masks or vaccines; it represented a deeper conflict over who decides truth, what constitutes legitimate expertise, and where to draw boundaries around state power.

Populist radical right parties proved particularly adept at exploiting these cultural anxieties. Their evolution was remarkable: from initially supporting strict measures (some even criticizing governments for not acting quickly enough) to embracing elaborate conspiracy theories about “corona dictatorships” and “Great Reset” plots. Germany’s AfD, the Netherlands’ Forum for Democracy, and others successfully wove diverse grievances – from anti-vaccination sentiment to economic anxiety – into a unified narrative of elite oppression.

Geography of Discontent

The pandemic’s political impact varied significantly across European regions, revealing deep-rooted differences in political culture. Southern European countries saw higher protest volumes, predominantly focused on economic issues and organized by traditional left-wing actors like trade unions. Northern European protests, conversely, centered on freedom and cultural concerns, often mobilized by new movements combining diverse ideological elements.

These patterns reflect historical legacies and institutional differences. Southern Europe’s tradition of agonistic protest culture, shaped by histories of democratic transition and economic vulnerability, manifested in rapid mobilization around material concerns. Northern Europe’s protests emerged later but proved more culturally oriented, focusing on vaccination mandates and individual liberty rather than economic support.

Timing mattered too. Economic protests erupted immediately in April 2020, while cultural mobilization peaked during the vaccination mandate period of late 2021. There was no sustained “rally around the flag” effect – the crisis immediately became politically contested terrain.

The Limits of Unity

Despite simultaneous activation of economic and cultural grievances, successful cross-cutting mobilization proved remarkably difficult. Traditional left-wing organizations focused on worker protection and economic support, while right-wing movements emphasized freedom and anti-system narratives. Attempts to bridge these divides, such as French unions incorporating freedom rhetoric or student movements combining economic and cultural demands, largely failed to maintain coherent coalitions.

This fragmentation suggests the cultural super-cleavage may be increasingly difficult to transcend. The pandemic didn’t create these divisions but revealed and intensified them, potentially reshaping European party systems for years to come.

Lessons for Future Crises

The research offers crucial lessons for managing future emergencies. First, building trust in scientific institutions cannot wait until crisis strikes. Countries with long-standing investments in science communication and institutional transparency saw greater compliance and less radical opposition. Second, technocratic approaches, while efficient, face particular legitimacy challenges. Governments that combined expert advice with visible democratic deliberation maintained greater public support than those perceived as imposing top-down solutions.

Third, one-size-fits-all approaches are destined to fail. Regional variations in political culture, economic structure, and institutional trust require flexible, adapted responses. The EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility recognized this need for national adaptation, though implementation varied in practice.

As Europe faces new challenges – from climate change to geopolitical instability – these lessons remain vital. Effective crisis management requires more than technical expertise or economic resources. It demands careful attention to political dynamics, cultural sensitivities, and above all, the fundamental legitimacy of democratic governance. The pandemic taught us that in moments of crisis, trust matters more than money, and ideology more than interest. Future preparedness must account for these realities.

This text summarises some of the findings in the REGROUP paper “The Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on political cleavages in Europe: Lessons learned and policy recommendations for democratic resilience“.